'Globalisation' is rapidly replacing the 'Cold War' as the most overused and under-specified explanation for a variety of events in international relations. For some, it represents a natural, indeed inexorable, progression towards a 'borderless world' signalling the end of the modern international state system as we know it. Analysis is underwritten by faith in, and exhortation to, the future. For others, the concept is over-stated and its benign influences are exaggerated. Indeed, globalisation is dangerous and perhaps even non-existent as a phenomenon. Furthermore, its invocation generates fear and resistance.
Introduction
'Globalisation' is rapidly replacing the 'Cold War' as the most overused and under-specified explanation for a variety of events in international relations. For some, it represents a natural, indeed inexorable, progression towards a 'borderless world' 1 signalling the end of the modern international state system as we know it. Analysis is underwritten by faith in, and exhortation to, the future. For others, the concept is over-stated and its benign influences are exaggerated. Indeed, globalisation is dangerous and perhaps even nonexistent as a phenomenon. Furthermore, its invocation generates fear and resistance. It is a subterfuge to justify cuts in employment and welfare. As Hirst and Thompson suggest, "Globalisation is a myth suitable for a world without illusions, but it is also one that robs us of hope" leading to "the pathology of over diminished expectations". 2 This difference in interpretation has given rise to the debate between those who characterise the world as 'going global' and those who see it 'remaining international'. The essence of this dispute is between those who see the emergence of a number of salient alternative authority structures, especially in the corporate world, that compete (increasingly successfully) with states in determining the direction of the global political economy (globalisers or globalists) and those who still see the states as the principal actors in global political and economic orders (internationalists) 3 with security issues as still paramount. 4 At their boldest, both positions are caricatures. In this paper we argue that it is more accurate (albeit less parsimonious for theorising) to see state and non-state authority existing in a much more contingent, interactive and dynamic manner.
Firms, social forces, international regimes, international institutions, and NGOS do not always operate in either ignorance of, or defiance of, the state. Similarly, the state is not always too weak to combat activities it does not like. In the abiding search for parsimony, scholarship to date has sought to develop a one-dimensional conception of the cause and effect of globalisation. Contingency has been sacrificed to generalisation. The result is that we have yet to provide a satisfactory taxonomy of the study of globalisation. In this paper we try to provide a multi-perspectival, but ordered, formulation in which the relationship between definition, proposition, the location of politics and the form of contest are linked by a common ontological and epistemological underpinnings. Simply put, there is a strong thread between how globalisation is defined on the one hand, and the form, manner, location and practice of policy towards it on the other. The paper is divided into three sections.
In section one, we attempt to bring some definitional order to the concept of globalisation.
We identify four definitions of globalisation in common use in both the scholarly and the policy community. These are we call (i) globalisation as historical epoch; (ii) globalisation as the confluence of economic phenomena; (iii) globalisation as the triumph or American values; and (iv) globalisation as sociological and technological revolution. In section two, we identify four propositions or theses--mirroring the multi-perspectival definitions offered in section one--that we consider to be central to any understanding of the emerging field of 'globalisation studies' in international relations. We call these (i) the Redistributive thesis,
(ii) the Regionalism thesis, (iii) the Modernisation thesis and (iv) the Internet thesis. As analytical approaches to globalisation studies, they reflect the ontologies and epistemologies of the definitions from which we argue they are derived. In section three we identify the arenas of power and policy contest and the principal actors involved in these contests in an era of globalisation. In so doing, we focus on the changing relationship between market power and state authority and the role of both state and non-state actors in this process, thereby revealing significant contextual, empirical and normative variation in the authoritative relationship between states, markets and civil society.
(1) So What is Globalisation? Towards a Fourfold Taxonomy
Globalisers argue that both quantitative and qualitative changes are taking place in the relationship between economic activity in the realm of global markets and political activity in the realm of inter-state relations. For globalisers, these activities represent more than just the simple internationalisation of economic activity. They represent a fundamental evolution in the relationship between market power and state authority. In the major governance structures of the global order we are witnessing a shift from public to private regulation and from territorial to trans-territorial forms of authority. To proponents of this view it represents an epochal stage in the development of capitalism.
The expansion of international economic activity relative to state based activity offers the prospect for efficiency gains through specialisation. In addition, to the extent that regionalism is barrier-reducing and trade-inducing rather than trade-restricting, it too possesses positive qualities. Yet not all share this image of globalisation as both existent and benign. Indeed, the benign view of globalisation is contested in a range of quarters, focusing in many cases on an apparent paradox; if globalisation is redefining the boundaries of state power in a way that makes its 'retreat' so apparent, why does the state play such a prominent role in the adjudication of contested claims in the retrenchment of the welfare state? Consistent with Polanyi's seminal study of the development of the market in the context of the British economy, 5 sceptics suggest that the state retains a central role, one that it has either chosen in part to relinquish (for ideological reasons 6 ) or has been redefined to be incorporated in the context of bargaining within a supranational organisational structure.
On one side of this equation is therefore the sustained focus on the behavior of the states in 6 See Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (New York: Macmillan, 1974 ). This would be construed as Luke's third face of power according to which after coercion and the capacity to set the agenda for decisionmaking comes the capacity to influence values--thus often defining choices in a manner consistent with the greater power's interests. state, the market and representatives of civil society including subordinated classes, ethnic groups, racial minorities and women. In both the developed and the developing world, workers in declining industries see globalisation as an economic threat to their welfare. The same logic applies to the relationship between the state and recipients of welfare, and within states that are the potential destinations for migrant workers. In this realm, opponents of globalisation divide between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', stressing the redistributive consequences of globalisation both between and within states.
The essence of the paradox identified above--the apparent retreat of the state in the context of privatisation on the one hand when contrasted with evidence of the emboldening of the state in some other domains on the other--is encapsulated in the debate between globalisers and internationalists If the state is retreating, globalisers proposes, then the study of globalisation should concentrate primarily on the private or non-profit sectors rather than the public sector. But this is not the case in much of the scholarly, or policy oriented, literature most of which does not take us beyond the banal characterisation of globalisation as a contested concept. The substantive realm of what we wish to term 'globalisation studies' may best be described as in intellectual disarray. This disarray cannot be transcended as long as we have a 'definitional deficit' in which many studies fail to adequately differentiate the relationship between the state and supranational or intergovernmental actors on the one hand and the state and non-state actors on the other. We need to ask therefore how we may we substantively and analytically frame the field of 'globalisation studies' so as to include the diverse research programmes that cohabit under its general rubric?
Understandings of globalisation are multi-dimensional--political, ideological, economic, cultural--and often caricatures of complex arguments. Rarely, however, is it defined in other than narrow economistic terms--usually by reference to the change in the ratios of trade and FDI as a share of GDP. In order to provide a meaningful taxonomy, we have to locate definitions of globalisation within two initial broad modes of understanding often offered, too imprecisely we would argue, as definitions of globalisation themselves. These two initial modes of understanding (as opposed to definitions) are of globalisation as: (i) the emergence of a set of sequences and processes that are unhindered by territorial or jurisdictional barriers and that indeed enhance the spread of trans-border practices in economic, political, cultural and social domains, (ii) as a discourse of political knowledge offering views of how to make the post-modern world manageable. For many policy makers, globalisation as knowledge, however defined, constitutes a new reality that renders redundant the language and imagery of a state-centric world and identifies globalisation, with its underlying assumptions, as the determinant of a policy makers understanding of what is possible and thinkable.
Yet even with this first cut, the 'meaning' of globalisation still remains illusive. The reason for this is obvious. Globalisation needs to be viewed differently through different normative and theoretical lenses. In order to offer some greater clarity we therefore offer four alternative understandings of globalisation. The superiority of this approach, we suggest in the later sections of this paper, is both theoretical and practical. At the theoretical level it allows us to proceed from the four definitions to highlighting the disciplinary assumptions that underpin them. From the disciplinary assumptions we can then move to a taxonomy of the sub fields of globalisation studies and--importantly for an insight into the policy implications of the competing definitions--on to a taxonomy of the sites of policy contest in which the differing definitions and assumptions can be seen to have either heightened or diminished salience. period of history--rather than a sociological phenomenon or a theoretical framework. It is broadly dated from the beginning of detente and the end of the Cold War, and is immortalised in the destruction of the Berlin wall. 7 It is in effect the first clear historical phase after the end of the Cold War. This is a temporal definition--time is the crucial factor. Whether causally related or not, globalisation as a period might be said to 'succeed' the Cold War historically. The economic counterpart to the bi-polar strategic conflict of the Cold War was the post world war two, post colonial 'developmentalist project' through which the capitalist economy was stabilised. 8 Like the Cold War before it the term 'globalisation' serves as a time bound template for describing a context in which events occur. Globalization might be considered (retrospectively) as a historical period --comparable to Ernst Nolte's claim that fascism represented an epoch and not a 7 T. Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (NY: Random House, 1993). This fourth definition suggests that a revolution is taking place not only in relations between the state and the economy, but also with civil society. In its most naive form proponents of this view contend that:
In the developed countries of the West, new technology will lead to big productivity increases that will cause high economic growth --actually, waves of technology will continue to role out through the early part of the 21st century. And then the relentless process of globalisation, the opening up of national economies and the integration of markets, will drive the growth calls forth--be they at regional or local levels discussed later in this paper.
The movement from our definitions Social democrats and Marxists thus now focus their attention on redistribution in the context of globalisation. 25 But for them, globalisation is not simply an unfettered economic phenomenon but also a politico-ideological one that acts as a rationalisation for emerging trends in contemporary governance. To the extent that globalisation is declared to be 'market driven' it has to-date been largely devoid of serious analysis of its political contexts or potentials for resistance from those adversely affected by it. But this denies the manner in which Globalization has speeded up the long term secular tendency of governance--driven by socio-economic theories of rationality and efficiency--to be transferred from the state to the individual. This is not the same as saying that the state is becoming less intrusive, rather that greater responsibility is placed on individuals to organise their lives.
In this context, debates about the 'end of', 'retreat of' or 'decline of' the state need to be reformulated. Marxists and Social Democrats argue that the end of the Keynesian welfare state and the rise of the neo-liberal one in many countries is not the same as the end of the state itself, but the end of a particular form of state as we grew to understand it in the developed democracies.
The most developed variant of this argument--certainly the most over theorised--is to be found in the neo-Gramscian analysis of the relationship between the state and globalisation.
A process of internationalisation of the state has taken place which, according to Robert A comparable dynamic is at work in the context of regionalism, also a contested term. scale structural transformation that is taking place in the global economy. Internationalist proponents of the comparative capitalism thesis do not deny that global change is occurring.
But they remain sceptical about the extent of the diminution of state authority.
We must contend with a complex of: (i) de facto processes of economic integration, firmled and network-led within markets, at both the global and the regional levels on the one The counter hypothesis to this professed convergence finds its voice in political terms in facilities, and manufacturing processes, all of which reconstitute the international division of labour.
Its most extreme theoretical perspective posits the view that we are witnessing a decisive shift away from industrial capitalism to a post-industrial conception of economic relations.
The same economic phenomena identified earlier are important not just because they represent a unique cluster of activity but because they represent a new form of activity. This view depicts a striking revolution among techno-industrial elites, that ultimately render the globe a single market. 53 This is a comprehensive and complex vision: of globally integrated production; of specialised but interdependent labour markets; of the rapid privatisation of state assets; and of the inextricable linkage of technology across conventional national borders. 54
A paradigmatic shift is taking place that influences the way we reconceptualise not only the importance of traditional factor endowments--land, labour and capital--in the context of new 'knowledge based industries', but also reconceptualise a variety of social and economic relations. In a manner not dissimilar to the Modernisation thesis discussed earlier, the Internet thesis generates the notion that globalisation offers the prospect of 'the end of history'. 55 But also like the modernisation approach, it similarly fails to acknowledge the neoliberal ideological strain at the heart of the globalisation process.
Normatively and prescriptively, most economists and policy makers--imbued with an (unrecognised or at least unacknowledged) ideology of liberalism--take an optimistic view of globalisation, consistent with this thesis. The expansion of international economic activity relative to state based activity offers the prospect for efficiency gains through specialisation. They play down any potential negative redistributive consequences or argue 53 Carnoy, Castells, and Cohen, The New Global Economy, op cit. p. 4-5 use the term in a generic sense to refer to investment, production, management, markets, labour, information, and technology now "organised across national borders." See also Manuel Castells, The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban Regional Process (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
54 Some analysts label the latter process "glocalisation," where the an extensive reorganisation of economic activities is underway at regional/local levels, while an explosion of information/communication and commodities/services flows is occurring across cities, regions, and nations. Note that it is not just business enthusiasts who speak in such terms, but also spokesmen for non-governmental organisations who seek to rally constituencies for globe-spanning environmental, labour, and other sorts of policies.
55 see Fukuyama, op cit.
that a raising tide lifts all ships. Costs to displaced individuals, they argue, are off-set by overall welfare gains. Furthermore, although many of the policy prescriptions focus on tight monetary policy, much work in this area focuses on the corporation as the central actor. Firms develop strategies that try to transcend borders and institutionalise themselves, thus enhancing their flexibility and establish geographically dispersed corporate networks.
At its worst, the 'internet thesis' can descend into a crude form of technological determinism. It is here that critics castigate the assertion of inevitability that lies behind the transference of authority to the market mechanism. They contend that the change in the position of the modern state in this global context has not been simply structurally determined. In part it has been self-induced and it should be recognised that states have been significant contributors through their own 'regulatory reforms' which some now fear have led to a growing ungovernability of some global markets--especially financial markets, and especially since the currency crises of East Asia. A backlash against the liberalising tendencies inherent in the Internet thesis may be coming, and not only in victim countries. Even free markets champions such as the Financial Times are now calling for greater regulation of financial markets. 56
(3) Arenas of Power and Policy Contest in an Era of Globalisation
In this section we discuss some of the sites of contest--or policy arenas, if preferred--in which various actors address the policy issues of contest identified in the previous section.
We attempt to demonstrate the manner in which different understandings of globalisation may determine which actors privilege which kinds of issues and the domains in which they will choose to advance or resist chosen issues. Firstly, however we note, several general trends that tend to apply in the current era. An effect of globalisation in advanced industrialised economies, is an acceptance that citizens will not have the same access to the job security (for white collar as well as blue collar workers), services and redistributive arrangements that prevailed under the welfare state system. While it may have created more jobs than it has destroyed, globalisation has been particularly hard for organised labour in traditional manufacturing sectors in the old industrialised countries. 57 As the American waitress says "Sure President Clinton has created millions of new jobs--I have three of them!"
Labour--unlike capital, technology and knowledge is not mobile--and this has diminished its political power. This has implications for politics at the local--or sub-state--level. Semi and un-skilled labour does not have the same stake in, or share the benefits of, globalisation that the educated, moneyed and skilled sections of the community receive. Moreover, liberalising governments will not, or cannot, implement policies that might alleviate their deteriorating position. Protectionist policies, advocated by nationalists of both the left and right, might help unskilled workers but they are known to be welfare reducing overall.
The optimum strategy--reducing the relative supply of unskilled labour via enhanced education and training, supported by subsidies to overcome wage rigidities 58 --is either too 57 This accounts for why unskilled workers are the major losers as the relocation of firms and FDI from developed to developing countries takes place. This leads to major changes in the labour markets of the advanced industrial countries such as the UK. A strong downwards pressure on wages in OECD countries--especially for unskilled workers--can be identified. No matter how one distinguishes skilled from unskilled workers, OECD countries are exhibiting rises in income inequality as enhanced technological innovation and substitution move employment levels in favour of skilled workers. These general changes in identity and action, take on specific political and economic form A more comprehensive analysis would need to consider in addition, the role of trade unions, pressure groups, the media and much more difficulty to define, that emerging range of policy networks and policy communities that now operate across frontiers in semi organised but non formalised fashion. All these bodies to a greater or lesser degree impinge--negatively or positively--on the contemporary forms of governmental authority. over its area of strategic concern. Glocalisation is first of all a political and only in the second place a business location strategy: a company following a strategy of glocalisation will localise activities abroad (1) only if the company otherwise risks being treated as an 'outsider', or being hit by trade or investment barriers thus losing market share, and (2) to the extent that the company can exert more control over its host governments than viceversa". 84
This facet of glocalisation is also reflected in the tendency of firms to pursue strategic alliances or joint ventures, notwithstanding that these phenomena are generally regarded as signs of globalisation, not an alternative. But this view fails to capture the notion that strategic alliances are a tacit admission of the continuation of distinct and sustained forms of capitalism. It is the lack of market expertise and institutional access in the face of nontariff barriers on the one hand, coupled with a capacity to generate trading partners that generates strategic alliances. Risks are shared because of critical investment factors. In a globalised world in which tastes are increasingly homogenised and barriers rendered irrelevant, the demand for strategic alliances and joint ventures would be significantly
reduced. Yet as an analysis of the behaviour of US firms in Japan demonstrates, they are not. 85 When coupled with the propensity towards the centralisation of authority and R&D expenditures, the urge towards strategic alliances and co-development and production, distinguishes MNCs from a TNCs, reflecting a glocalising strategy. The aims and structure of these organisations cannot be discussed in detail here save to reiterate that they are less societally driven, more state sponsored, NGOs. Members of these organisations invariably share common philosophical positions on a range of key issues such as the nature of economic and security cooperation. Their activities at the regional level are not, in the language of Europe, geared towards sovereignty pooling, rather than towards sovereignty enhancement and regime maintenance. In both a rhetorical and a practical sense, they are invariably resistive to the notion of enhancing policy influence from within the wider reaches of civil society. Indeed, they play an important second track role in the development of a limited form of civil society in the region that differs significantly from that which is understood in a 'western context'. 88 These are elite There may well be an emerging cognitive dimension to the positions adopted by Asian trans-regional policy elites generated via a process of systemic interaction both internally to the region. 89 In contrast to those sectors of the community dispossessed by globalisation who turn inwards (or localise) many of those involved in the contemporary international governance processes (both public and private)--that is those beneficiaries of globalisation in a range of different ways as we suggested at D-C above--are engaged in reinforcing their strategic position as policy making elites. As they become increasingly internationalised and transnationalised they eschew social responsibility within side the nation state and identify increasingly with similar groups beyond the nation state. 92 It is this group we are referring to when we talk of transnational policy communities.
Conclusion: Globalisation and Authority in Twenty-First Century
Our purpose has been to suggest that just as the complexion and purpose of actors varies by area, so does the form and purpose of power in an era of globalisation. Globalisation has many facets and we have offered one taxonomy of how to identify these facets and the domains in which each operates. The paper has aspired to four tasks. The first has been to bring some conceptual clarity to the overused and under-specified concept of globalisation. The second has been to take advantage of this clarification to instil some coherence and discipline to the realm of globalisation studies. The third objective has been to flesh out those underlying theses of globalisation central to each area of study. consequence interacts with it in a specific way. Power in each context is, therefore, correspondingly defined in peculiar terms.
For proponents of the Comparative Regionalism/Capitalism thesis and the multinational actors which become so important in it, the state needs to be seen as a series of related institutional structures marked by varied access points in a pluralist form. Both the institutional structures and non-state actors here interact with and feed off each other in an organic process whereby values are shared and rules are codified. For example, even as Japanese firms form subsidiaries these, in turn, replicate similar modes of behaviour--not simply in production systems but also in labour policies. Corporate concerns to sustain employment at home remain paramount. Here power is shared, unwittingly or not, and the degree of cooperation or conflict varies by national, sectoral and even issue
context.
In the realm of the Modernisation thesis it is NGOs which are the predominant non-state actors. The corresponding distinction is between the state and civil society, the state's role being to reconstitute an erstwhile illegitimate, edifice, which has hitherto stood above civil society with incresingly unstable structures of support. Here the purpose of power for civil society is not to resist the state but to change its fundamental character, reinventing it with both Smithian and Lockean faces in a post-Keynesian welfare era.
Whether this is done by consciously exporting the American liberal model or by attempting to universalise human rights, labour or environmental standards, the product is anticipated to be that of an active citizenry engaged in a civic polity rather than as subjects of the state.
The Internet Thesis differs again, focusing on supposedly borderless and boundless TNCs as its major instrument of change. Conflict is between amorphous market structures--which, at least nominally, represent society through a reflection of the tastes and wants of consumers--and a monolithic state apparatus. The conflict is clear-cut; power is defined, ironically for liberals, in realist terms, as a zero-sum concept, unable to be shared. In yet another irony, Polanyi is inverted; the market is seen as the defender of civil society and the state as the oppressor. Markets instil the discipline and order desired by consumers, while providing the additional benefits of wealth and--eventually--democracy. The state can either surrender peacefully or be destroyed. Traditional understandings of politics assume that authority resides in the state. In similar historical vein, traditional understandings of politics also assume that legitimacy too resides in the state. In this paper we have rejected such absolutist analytical positions in favour of those which argue that the relationship between power on the one hand, and authority and legitimacy on the other, are fluid and varied in substance and contingent in form.
Globalisation, while over-hyped in some instances does represent a challenge to our accepted understanding of the relationship between power and authority. This is not to 93 See Ruigrok and van Tulder, op. cit., pp.133-137.
simply to imply that we are witnessing the passing of the Westphalian system nor that states are retreating on every front. States are not passive actors, nor are they always in retreat, but their room for manoeuvre is always contingent. We have attempted to explore the conditions under which they maintain, share and even secede authority to other actors of both an inter-state and non-state variety. 
